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PROBLEMS IN PROBATING FOREIGN WILLS AND
USING FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES
Harold G. Wren*
T HE purpose of this Article is to analyze some of the problems
involved in the probating of foreign wills and the use of foreign
representatives. In the research of this topic, chief consideration was
given to the law of Mexico and Texas. Yet at the outset, it is im-
portant to emphasize the many different bodies of law which must
be considered to solve a particular problem in this area. Initially, it
is necessary to be familiar with the internal law of the two juris-
dictions. Then one must apply the appropriate conflicts rule to de-
termine the applicable internal law. Because of renvoi, conflict among
the conflicts rules, and the use of different conflicts rules for different
purposes, there is an agglomerate of threads which must be carefully
unraveled to solve any given problem.
I. INHERITANCE
In the area of conflicts law, there are substantial differences be-
tween Mexico and Texas. Like the majority of civil law countries,
Mexico relies principally on nationality of the decedent in deciding
questions of choice of law governing the succession of property at
death;' whereas, Texas is guided by Anglo-American concepts which
emphasize domicile if movables are involved' and situs if immovables.'
Since 1857, the federal form of government has prevailed in
Mexico, and the states of the Mexican Union have enjoyed autonomy
in matters of civil legislation. Each state has enacted its own civil
code and laws of procedure, but the legislation of the Federal District
has profoundly influenced this legislation. Thus, law of both suc-
cession and conflicts is relatively homogeneous throughout Mexico.
*Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. A.B., LL.B., Columbia University;
J.S.D., Yale Law School; formerly Professor of Law, University of Mississippi, University of
Oklahoma, Visiting Professor of Law, University of California, Cornell University.
'Codigo Civil de Mexico [The Civil Code for the Federal District and Territories of
Mexico] arts. 12, 14 (1950).
'Saner-Ragley Lumber Co. v. Spivey, 238 S.W. 912 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922) (rule
said to be based on comity as to nonresident intestate); Simpson v. Knox, I Posey Tex.
Unrep. Cas. 569 (Tex. Comm. App. 1880) (final distribution of assets conceded to the
domicile); McClain v. Holder, 279 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error 'ref. n.r.e.
(personal property acquired by intestate who died resident in Texas).
'Davis v. Atlantic Oil Prod. Co., 87 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1936); Waterman v. Charlton,
102 Tex. 510, 120 S.W. 171 (1909); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 101 Tex. 118, 105 S.W.
38 (1907); Hornsby v. Bacon, 20 Tex. 556 (1857); Pilgrim v. Griffin, 237 S.W.2d 448
(Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref. n.r.e.; King v. Lowry, 80 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App.
1935) error ref.; Richardson v. Temple Lumber Co., 46 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932)
error dism.
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By way of contrast, in the United States there are many differ-
ences among the various states insofar as succession is concerned,
although there is probably a greater uniformity with regard to con-
flicts. The latter may be attributed to such influences as Professor
Beale, the Restatement, Conflict of Laws, and the full faith and
credit and due process clauses of the United States Constitution.
Since the United States emphasis is on domicile rather than nation-
ality, primary concern is with the state in which the decedent was
domiciled rather than his possible status as a United States citizen.
For example, suppose a domiciliary of Texas migrates to Mexico
and becomes permanently domiciled there. He remains a citizen of
the United States, and later dies intestate, owning assets in both
Mexico and Texas. How would his property be distributed?
Under the Texas conflicts rule, the law governing movables owned
at death is the law of Mexico. Under the Mexican conflicts rule, the
law of the decedent's nationality, that is, the law of the United
States, governs with respect to any assets (movables or immovables)
located outside of Mexico.4 However, a reference to the law of the
United States indicates that that jurisdiction, viz., the United States,
has no inheritance law. The problem can be resolved by treating the
law of the jurisdiction where the decedent was formerly domiciled
(Texas) as the governing law of the United States for purposes of
determining how the decedent's property should be distributed. This
rationale provides the following results:
(1) Property (movables and immovables) in Mexico pass under
Mexican law whether the conflicts rule of Mexico (situs) or the
conflicts rule of Texas (domicile) is applied.
(2) Immovables in Texas pass under Texas law whether the con-
flicts rule of Texas (situs) or Mexico (nationality) is applied.
(3) Movables outside of Mexico pass under Mexican law if the
Texas rule (domicile) is applied, and under Texas law if the Mexi-
can rule (nationality) is applied.
Whether Texas or Mexican conflicts rules are applied depends upon
the law of the forum. Hence, if the takers are the same under the
Texas and Mexican inheritance law, it matters little where we seek
the initial administration. However, if the takers are not the same,
it is necessary to choose carefully the forum for the administration.
Suppose that the Texas law of inheritance is more favorable to
a client, who accordingly seeks an administration in Texas. On our
facts, Texas will apply the Mexican law with respect to inheritance
4 In this respect Mexico departs somewhat from the traditional conflicts rule in civil law
countries which places such a heavy emphasis on nationality.
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of movables outside of Mexico. But does this mean that the Texas
courts will apply the Mexican conflicts rule or the Mexican law
governing inheritance? If the former, a renvoi situation may result,
since the conflicts rule refers back to Texas. If the Texas court ap-
plies renvoi, presumably it would "accept the renvoi" and apply
Texas inheritance law to the movables outside Mexico. On the other
hand, if the court looks to the internal law of Mexico governing
inheritance, it would simply determine the takers based on such law.
II. UNITY V. PLURALITY OF SUCCESSION
The next factor to be kept in mind is the existence of varying
concepts with regard to succession. Under the dominant Anglo-
American conflict of laws view, when property is located in more
than one jurisdiction or when the decedent's domicile at death is
different from the situs of his property, it is possible to have a
plurality of successions. Thus, there is an "original" probate or
administration in the domiciliary jurisdiction and "ancillary" pro-
ceedings elsewhere. Since these proceedings are under the authority
of equal sovereigns, no one proceeding takes precedence over another.
Although there is little Texas case law on the subject,' it is assumed
that Texas follows this basic concept.
Mexico, however, follows a unity concept of succession based on
nationality. By this view there is one jurisdiction which determines
all matters with regard to the succession of a decedent's property.
This is true even though Mexico recognizes that local law will govern
domestic assets of a foreign decedent.
III. FORM OF WILLS
The problem becomes more complex when the law governing the
form of a will is considered. Under Mexican law, a will is either
"ordinary" or "special." There are three types of ordinary wills
(public open, public closed, and holographic) and four types of
special wills (private, military, maritime, and those made in a for-
eign country). Texas recognizes three types of wills: attested, holo-
graphic, and nuncupative. The attested or holographic will may be
"self-proved." It is necessary to consider each of these wills from
the standpoint of formalities and then determine the conflicts rules
to be applied when one of these wills is offered for probate in a
jurisdiction other than the one where it was executed.
:Cf. Simpson v. Knox, 1 Posey Tex. Unrep. Cas. 569 (Tex. Comm. App. 1880) (final
distribution of assets "conceded" to administration of the domicile, not to ancillary ad-
ministrations in other countries).
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The private,' military,7 and maritime' wills of Mexico, and the
nuncupative9 will of Texas, are permissible only in certain special
situations and will not be considered further. This leaves the holo-
graphic wills in Texas and Mexico, the public open and public closed
wills in Mexico, and the attested will in Texas.
A. Holographic Wills
A holographic will in Texas must be signed and wholly written
in the handwriting of the testator." Mexico adds the requirement
that it be dated.1' The code expressly permits aliens to execute a
holographic will in their own language.1" Also, in Mexico, the testator
must make his will in duplicate and impress his fingerprint on each
6 A private will is permitted in the following cases: (a) when the testator is attacked by
an illness so violent and serious that there is no time for a notary to appear; (b) when
there is no notary in the town or judge to act as notary; (c) when it is impossible or at
least very difficult for a notary or judge to appear at the execution of the will; or (d) when
soldiers or persons attached to the army are on campaign or are prisoners of war. The testator
must not be able to make a holographic will in order for the private will to be executed.
Codigo Civil de Mexico art. 1565. The testator declares his last will in the presence of five
witnesses and one of them draws it up in writing, if the testator is unable to write. Codigo
Civil de Mexico art. 1567. Three witnesses are sufficient in cases of the greatest urgency.
Codigo Civil de Mexico art. 1569. A private will takes effect only if the testator dies of
the illness or in the danger in which he was at the time or within one month after the
disappearance of the cause which authorized the will. Codigo Civil de Mexico art. 1571.
If a soldier or person attached to the army makes a will at the moment of entering
into action or when wounded on the battlefield, it is sufficient for him to declare his will
before two witnesses or to deliver to them a closed paper containing his last will, signed in
his handwriting. Codigo Civil de Mexico art. 1579. A will made in writing is delivered after
death of the testator to the Secretary of National Defense who remits it to the competent
judicial authority. Codigo Civil de Mexico art. 1581. Oral wills are reported to the Secretary
of National Defense for proper action. Codigo Civil de Mexico art. 1582. Texas formerly
permitted "any soldier in actual military service, or any mariner or seaman being at sea" to
dispose of his personal property without any formalities. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 8290
(1925), repealed, Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 434(b) (1956).
'Persons on the high seas on board vessels of the national marine, whether war or mer-
chant, may make wills in accordance with the following provisions: (a) the will must be
written in the presence of two witnesses and of the ship's captain; (b) it must be done
in duplicate and appear in the ship's log; (c) a copy must be deposited with a Mexican
diplomatic agent if the ship should arrive in a port where such an agent is present; (d)
when the ship reaches Mexican territory, the other copy (or both, if none was left else-
where) must be delivered to the local maritime authority. Codigo Civil de Mexico arts.
1583-88.
Maritime wills produce legal effects only if the testator dies at sea or within one month
after disembarkation. Codigo Civil de Mexico art. 1591.
'Nuncupative, or oral, wills are valid when made in the last illness of the deceased and
it is "proved by three credible witnesses that the testator called on a person to take notice
or bear testimony that such is his will .. " Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 65 (1956). For a
recent case holding that a nuncupative will had not been proved, see Hargis v. Nance, 159
Tex. 263, 317 S.W.2d 922 (1958).
"9Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 60 (1956).
1'Codigo Civil de Mexico arts. 1550, 1551.
"Codigo Civil de Mexico art. 1552.
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copy." He then deposits the will in the public registry.14 The original
is kept there, and the duplicate is sent back to the testator."
A holographic will which satisfies the formal requirements of
Mexican law will satisfy those of Texas, although the reverse may
not be true. Two further observations should be noted: (1) only
nineteen American jurisdictions recognize holographic wills, with
the result that there may be problems when the testator owns
property in some state (e.g., New York) other than Texas; (2) it
may not be feasible for an attorney to leave a lengthy and complex
will with the testator for recopying in order to make it holographic.
B. Public Open Will
Texas has no counterpart to the Mexican public open will. That
document is the same as the Louisiana "nuncupative will,'"" which
is executed before a notary and three competent witnesses. A testator
expresses his wishes to the notary, who then drafts the will and
reads it aloud. If the testator agrees that the draft is in accord with
his wishes, all parties sign the instrument, placing on it a statement
of the place, year, month, day, and hour of execution.
C. Public Closed And Attested Wills
If the testator's estate is at all complicated, an attorney, whether
a member of the Bar of Texas or of Mexico, must carefully draft
the will and have it typed by his secretary. He may then adopt the
following procedure to satisfy the formal requirements of both Texas
and Mexico.
He calls the testator, three witnesses, and a notary into a room
to be used for the execution ceremony. He closes the door, making
sure that no one leaves the room during the ceremony and that all
present concentrate without interruption on the business at hand.
He hands the will to the testator, who examines it and signs or
initials each page for identification purposes."7 The testator then
declares to the notary and the witnesses that the instrument is his
will and that he wants the witnesses to witness it and his signature.
He then signs the will at the end, each witness carefully watching
his signature as it is written. One witness reads the attestation clause
aloud, and each witness signs his name and writes his address. The
" Codigo Civil de Mexico art. 1 553.
'4 Codigo Civil de Mexico art. 1554.
"Codigo Civil de Mexico arts. 1555-64.
'6 La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1578 (West 1952); cf. Codigo Civil de Mexico arts. 1511-20.




testator and the witnesses watch as each witness signs his name. The
will is then closed and sealed, and the notary attaches the Texas self-
proving clause, which he reads to the testator and the witnesses. The
testator and the witnesses then each sign following the clause, and
the notary affixes his signature, his seal, and the date.
Such a will would be "self-proved" in Texas, and could be pro-
bated without the necessity of producing the witnesses. In Mexico,
either the witnesses would be called to testify at the probate or their
absence would be explained.
IV. PROBATE OF FOREIGN WILLS
Suppose one is confronted with the problem of probating a will
which satisfies the formal requirements of one jurisdiction but not
of the jurisdiction in which probate is sought. What rules govern the
admissibility of such a will to probate?
In Texas, in the absence of statute, the rules should be the same
as in the case of inheritance. Generally speaking with respect to im-
movables, the validity of the will is governed by the law of the
situs"8 while movables would be governed by the law of the domicile
of the decedent at death. 9 Fortunately, Texas has adopted some
statutes which are helpful when one attempts to probate a foreign
will. Some of these statutes have been law for many years. Others
were added upon the enactment of the Texas Probate Code, effective
in 1956. Section 103 of that Code provides:
Original probate of the will of a testator who died domiciled outside
this State which, upon probate, may operate upon any property in this
State, and which is valid under the laws of this State, may be granted
S.. under this Code, if the will does not stand rejected from probate
or establishment in the jurisdiction where the testator died domiciled,
or if it stands rejected from probate or establishment in the jurisdiction
where the testator died domiciled solely for a cause which is not ground
for rejection of a will of a testator who died domiciled in this State.
The court may delay passing on the application for probate of a foreign
will pending the result of probate or establishment, or a contest thereof,
at the domicile of the testator. (Emphasis added.)
In short, this section, taken from the Uniform Probate of Foreign
Wills Act, states that Texas will admit to original probate the will
of a Mexican domiciliary (1) if his will is valid in both Texas and
Mexico, and (2) if valid in Texas, even though not in Mexico.
Suppose, for example, a testator executed a valid Texas will when
18Restatement, Conflict of Laws S 249 (1934).
"' Restatement, Conflict of Laws S 306 (1934).
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he was domiciled there. He later moved to Mexico where he died
domiciled, leaving property in both Texas and Mexico. An "original"
(in the sense of being the first, not in the sense of being the probate
of the domiciliary jurisdiction) probate might be first obtained in
Texas if this were deemed desirable.
However, suppose that the hypothetical client moved to Mexico
and executed a new will, which satisfied the law of Mexico but not
Texas. In such event, letters testamentary should first be obtained
in Mexico with ancillary probate jurisdiction in Texas. Section 105
of the Texas Probate Code provides:
When a will or other testamentary instrument has been admitted
to probate in any state of the United States, or in any of [the] terri-
tories thereof, or in the District of Columbia, or in any country out of
the limits of the United States, and the executor named in such will or
other testamentary instrument has qualified, and a duly authenticated
copy of such will and of the probate thereof, and of the letters of such
executor, has been filed and recorded in a proper county in this state
under the provisions hereof, and such executor files application in the
proper court for letters testamentary, such letters shall be granted to
him, if he is qualified to serve in such capacity, and an order to that
effect shall be entered as in other cases; and if letters of administration
have previously been granted by such court in this state to any person
other than such foreign executor, such letters shall be revoked upon
the application of such executor after personal service of citation upon
the person to whom the letters were granted. (Emphasis added.)
The statute requires that the foreign executor be "qualified to serve
in such capacity." Section 78 (d)20 requires that a nonresident must
appoint a "resident agent to accept service of process in all actions
with respect to the estate" and file such appointment with the court
before he can qualify to serve as executor in the Texas proceeding.
The foreign executor must make this appointment of a resident
agent before he is appointed executor, and yet it is difficult to see
how he would have the power to make the appointment until he
was first named executor.
Article 173 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes requires that in
order for an alien to be appointed an executor or administrator, he
must legally be able to own land in Texas. But since "aliens who
are natural born citizens of nations which have a common land
boundary with the United States"" are expressly exempted from
the application of the statutes limiting alien land ownership, this
rule would not prevent a Mexican executor from qualifying in Texas.
"Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 78(d) (1956).
1Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 167(3) (1959).
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The converse situation exists when a Texas executor is seeking
probate of a Texas will in Mexico. Traditionally, the general con-
flicts rule in civil law countries governing the validity of the form
of a will is the law of the place of execution. However, during the
nineteenth century, a number of European countries added the lex
patriae as an option to the lex loci actus.22
Mexico adheres to the law of the place of execution, as evidenced
by the following statute: "Wills made in a foreign country shall
be effective in the Federal District and Territories if made in ac-
cordance with the laws of the country where they were executed."23
On the other hand, the code does allow a certain amount of volun-
tary subjection to Mexican law as evidenced by the following article:
Juridical acts in everything relating to their form shall be governed
by the laws of the place where they are executed. Nevertheless, Mexicans
or aliens residing outside of the Federal District or Territories are at
liberty to subject themselves to the forms prescribed by this Code, when
the act is to be carried out in the said demarcations.'
Thus, Mexico clearly recognizes the possibility that one owning
assets situated in Mexico may desire to make a will in conformity
with the formal requirements of Mexico, even though the will is
executed outside of Mexico. Such a procedure would certainly be
wise in view of the article 14 of the Civil Code: "Real property
situated in the Federal District and Territories, and personal property
found therein, shall be governed by the provisions of this Code, even
though the owners be aliens."
The formal requirements for a will do not present too great a
problem if only Texas and Mexico are involved. The insertion of
a third jurisdiction may further complicate the problem. For ex-
ample, assume a situation in which A dies domiciled in Mexico,
leaving movables located in Texas. A's will was executed in jurisdic-
tion X and does not satisfy the formal requirements of Mexico. In
this instance, since Mexico has a statute which makes a will valid if
it complies with the law of the place of execution, the will, insofar
as it relates to movables, is valid everywhere.
Or, take the situation in which A, a Mexican national, dies domi-
ciled in Texas. A leaves movables situated in jurisdiction X. X's
conflicts rule is the same as that of Texas (i.e., movables are governed
by the law of the place of the domicile of the decedent at death).
2 See, e.g., C6dice Civile Italiano di 1865, art. 9, par. 1; see also Burgerliches Gesetzbuch
[German Civil Code of 1896] art. 11, par. I (inverted order).23Codigo Civil de Mexico art. 1593.
14 Codigo Civil de Mexico art. 15.
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Accordingly, the validity of A's will will be governed by sections
103 and 105 of the Texas Probate Code.
Finally, assume the same facts as immediately above except that
X's conflicts rule is that the validity of A's will is governed by the
law of the jurisdiction of which A is a national at death. Since A is
a Mexican, and Mexico would look to Texas for purposes of de-
termining the validity of A's will, Texas law will govern.
V. SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW OF WILLS
Assuming the formal requirements to have a will admitted to
probate have been met, it is still necessary to determine (1) whether
the will is valid, and (2) if valid, how it should be construed.
In Texas, one must be nineteen years of age in order to execute
a will;2" in contrast, Mexico allows sixteen year olds to make wills. "
Of course, in both jurisdictions the more difficult questions of testa-
mentary capacity center around soundness of mind.
Mexico has an interesting method for permitting one who is de-
mented, but who may have a lucid interval, to make a will.2" The
demented person petitions the court for an examination of his mental
capacity. The court appoints two physicians to examine him, and
if the judge finds the patient to have the necessary capacity, the will
is executed forthwith. Such a will must contain an express state-
ment that "the patient preserved perfect lucidity of mind" during
the course of the execution.
Under Texas law, the burden of proving existence of requisite
testamentary capacity lies with the proponent unless the will is
self-proved. If not self-proved, the proponent must show that the
decedent had testamentary capacity, that the execution was proper,
and that the will was not revoked. If a witness is available, the easiest
method for proving the will is to have one of the subscribing wit-
nesses appear in open court and to take his sworn testimony or affi-
davit. Yet if the will was executed in Mexico, none of the subscrib-
ing witnesses may be available and depositions may become necessary.
Section 84 (c) of the Probate Code authorizes the taking of dep-
ositions when there is no contest. Section 22 of the Probate Code
prescribes the procedure when the witnesses are located in Texas.
However, if an attorney wishes to prove a will executed in Mexico
25Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 57 (1956). However, exceptions are provided for anyone
who is (1) lawfully married, (2) a member of the armed forces, or (3) a member of the
maritime service.
26 Codigo Civil de Mexico art. 1306(I).
17Codigo Civil de Mexico arts. 1307-12.
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in a Texas court, he will probably use article 3746(3) of the Texas
Civil Statutes, which prescribes the method for taking depositions
of persons residing in a foreign country. Rule 194 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure sets out the requisites for the commission
which is forwarded to the officer, e.g., a notary, in the foreign
country authorizing him to take the deposition.
Under the Texas conflicts rule, testamentary capacity, like validity
of execution, is governed by the law of the domicile at death with
respect to movables and the law of the situs with respect to immov-
ables." Mexico applies the same conflicts rule for testamentary ca-
pacity as for questions of form. Accordingly, when capacity is in
issue, there are much the same problems as when there is a problem
of formalities. Problems of undue influence, fraud, or revocation
would be resolved in much the same fashion as capacity.
VI. LIMITS ON POWER OF TESTATION
A more difficult problem is involved in the question of limitations
on the testator's power of testation. In Texas, a widow is protected
by community property and certain special rights such as the home-
stead, exempt property, and family allowance. Children may be
disinherited, but after-born or after-adopted children may claim
their intestate shares when they are pretermitted.
Under Mexican law, the testator may freely dispose of his estate
but must leave means of support to the following persons if they
have insufficient property of their own: (1) sons under twenty-one;
(2) sons unable to work; (3) unmarried daughters who live hon-
orably; (4) a widow while unmarried and living honorably; (5) a
widower while unable to work; (6) ascendants; (7) concubines, in
certain cases; (8) collaterals within the fourth degree if under
eighteen years of age or incapacitated.
Although the conflicts rules are much the same as those discussed
in connection with inheritance, the form of wills, and testamentary
capacity, an additional element occasionally involved is whether the
forum will recognize such restrictions even though against its own
public policy."' Usually there will be no objection to a system of
legitimate portions or forced shares different from its own. Con-
versely, if the foreign law gives a greater freedom, most courts have
held that such freedom will take precedence over any local restraint.
28Singleton v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 191 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945)
error re f. n.r.e.
94 Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study 325 (1958).
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Singleton v. St. Louis Union Trust Co." illustrates the problem.
The testator was domiciled in Missouri. He died testate, leaving land
in Texas, which was his separate property. His widow argued that
her right of election was controlled by Missouri law. Since she re-
nounced the will, she was entitled to none of its benefits, and the
decedent should be treated everywhere as having died intestate as
to her. Therefore, she argued, under Texas law governing the descent
of separate realty, she was entitled to a life estate in one-third of
the Texas lands.
The court of civil appeals held that since the husband, in Texas,
could do as he pleased with his separate property, the widow's re-
nunciation had the effect of relinquishing all interest which she
might have had in his separate property, and she therefore took no
interest in the Texas lands. In so holding, however, the court was
not rejecting Missouri law as being against Texas public policy so
much as it was applying the law of the situs to the wife's right of
election as it affected Texas land. Had the question involved mov-
ables with a situs in Texas, the result would probably have been
otherwise.
VII. CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS
When dealing with problems of construction, as distinguished
from validity, some have argued that a testator can only be expected
to know the law of his domicile at the time of the execution and
should not be burdened with guessing the meaning of certain clauses
as judged by the law of a later domicile at death. Accordingly, sec-
tion 308 of the Restatement, Conflict of Laws,3' provides that: "The
meaning of words used in a will of movables, in the absence of con-
trolling circumstances to the contrary, is determined in accordance
with the usage at the domicile of the testator at the time of making
the will." The Fifth Circuit has quoted this rule as the appropriate
conflicts rule of Texas in construing a will." However, the rule has
been changed in the Restatement (Second) to make the governing
law for construction "the local law of the state designated for this
purpose by the testator in the will."'" If the testator makes no desig-
nation, the law governing construction will be the same as that gov-
erning validity, that is, the law of the domicile of the decedent at
death.
0 191 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref. n.r.e.
" Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 308 (1934).
"Albuquerque Nat'l Bank v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 212 F.2d 943, 948-49 ($th Cir.
1954).
33 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 308 (1958).
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In drafting a will, it is certainly wise to insert an express designa-
tion of the controlling law. It is possible, of course, that "it may be
otherwise apparent from the language of the will or from other cir-
cumstances that the testator wished to have the local law of a par-
ticular state govern the construction of the instrument. In such a
case, the rules of construction of this state will be applied."3
The Mexican conflicts rule governing construction is apparently
the same as that governing validity, viz., lex loci actus.
VIII. ENFORCEMENT OF PROBATE DECREES
Having once determined the proper choice of law in the execu-
tion, construction, and probate of wills, thus establishing "original
probate jurisdiction," and having obtained a decree, the problem of
having the will admitted to probate in other jurisdictions then arises.
Two different questions are involved here: (1) the probate of the
will, and (2) the construction of the will once admitted to probate.
The first question is concerned with: "What is the testator's will"?
Once this is determined, we must ask the second question: "What
does his will mean"?
Probate decrees often answer both of these questions, stating first
that the instrument is "admitted to probate," and then stating what
the effects of the contents of the will are on the estate of the dece-
dent. A second jurisdiction (F-2) might accept the decree of the
original jurisdiction (F-1) for purposes of probate but construe the
instrument in accordance with its own principles of construction
without regard to the prior probate decree.
In dealing with problems of choice of law, it is necessary to ask:
Where was the will executed? Where was the decedent domiciled at
date of death? What was the decedent's nationality at death? Did
the property consist of movables, immovables, or both?
Then, moving from choice of law to the enforcement of probate
decrees, it is necessary to consider some additional questions: Who
were the parties in F-1 ? To what extent must F-2 give "full faith
and credit" to the decree of F-i ? What is the nature of the juris-
diction of F-1 and F-2 over (a) the property, and (b) the parties?
What are the views of F-i and F-2 with respect to concepts of
"original" and "ancillary" probate proceedings?
The term "jurisdiction" is often used to refer to the power of
a court of law to rule with respect to those persons or things be-
fore it. It is commonly said that probate jurisdiction is "in rem."
"4 Restatement, Cqnflict of Laws § 308, at 231-32 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
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From this it might be argued that any decree with respect to property
within the jurisdiction of the court would be binding everywhere.
This was the view taken by the Massachusetts court in the early case
of Crippen v. Dexter"5 decided over one hundred years ago.
In that case, the decedent died domiciled in Connecticut owning
Massachusetts land. The will was probated in Connecticut and then
offered for probate in Massachusetts with an authenticated copy of
the Connecticut decree, as permitted by the Massachusetts statute.
The heir at law, residing in Massachusetts, contended that since he
had no notice of the Connecticut proceeding, he was not bound by
the Connecticut decree and might raise such questions as capacity,
undue influence, and the like in the Massachusetts court. Chief Justice
Shaw denied the contest, ruling that the judgment of a probate
court allowing the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem binding
upon all persons interested in the property, though not named as
parties. The Massachusetts court could inquire only into the due
authentication of the foreign record, the jurisdiction of the foreign
court, whether there was local property upon which the will could
operate if admitted, and whether there had been fraud in obtaining
the foreign probate.
Chief Justice Shaw was probably influenced by two factors: (1)
that both the wills law and the conflicts rules of Massachusetts and
Connecticut were the same, and (2) that the adoption of a rule that
probate decrees are to be considered conclusive would undoubtedly
encourage a unified administration of the decedent's estate. Further-
more, he undoubtedly felt that once there had been a determination
of testacy or intestacy by one state, all other states would be bound
to follow this determination by reason of the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court of the United States has never taken this posi-
tion. On the contrary, it has left each state free to assert its full
power over local property in disregard of foreign probate judgments.
The Supreme Court has expressed its reasons as follows:
Now a judgment in rem binds only the property within the control
of the court which rendered it; ... as a judgment in rem it merely de-
termined the right to administer the property within the jurisdiction,
whether considered as directly operating on the particular things seized,
or the general status of assets there situated.36
A fortiori, where the full faith and credit clause is not involved, as
would be the case in any problem affecting Texas and Mexico, F-2
3579 Mass. (13 Gray) 330 (1859).
" Thormann v. Frame, 176 U.S. 350, 355 (1900).
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is in no way bound by F-i's prior probate decree with respect to
any property within F-2.
The Supreme Court has held that F-2 will be bound by a probate
decree of F-i with reference to any property within F-i's jurisdic-
tion." This is in accord with the conflicts rule where immovables are
involved but in conflict with the principle of mobilia sequuntur
personam. For example, A dies domiciled in F-2 owning movables
having a situs in F-I. A's executor goes into F-i and obtains a pro-
bate decree. F-2 is bound by the decree of F-i insofar as the mov-
ables located in F-i are concerned.
Although the Supreme Court has stated that the state of the situs
is not bound by the ruling in the domiciliary state, Texas, con-
fusing enforcement of foreign probate decrees with choice of law,
has held that when an ancillary proceeding is subsequently brought
in the state of the situs of the property, such a state (F-2) is bound
to follow the prior decree of the domiciliary state (F-1). The lead-
ing case is Holland v. Jackson."9 A will was probated in California,
the domiciliary state, in an ex parte proceeding in which the parties
were cited by publication. Thereafter, probate was sought in Texas
on an authenticated copy of the California record. The Texas claim-
ants, having no actual notice of the California proceedings, contested
on the ground that the will was a forgery. The Supreme Court of
Texas said:
It is fairly well settled by the weight of the authority in this country
that jurisdiction of the original probate of a will is possessed exclusively
by the courts of the state where the testator was domiciled when he
died. When the will is regularly probated there, the constitutional pro-
vision under consideration requires all sister states to give full faith and
credit to the order of probate as verifying the instrument. In such a
case, the question of authenticity of the instrument would be res ad-
judicata; but the question as to the legal effect of the instrument
would not be."9
In 1951, however, a court of civil appeals" distinguished Holland
v. Jackson in a case involving an Oklahoma decedent who died own-
ing land in Texas. The decedent was a woman who was unmarried
at the time of the execution of her will. Under Oklahoma law, an
unmarried woman's will is revoked by a later marriage. Proponents
of the will, without waiting for an administration to be started in
Oklahoma, sought probate of the will in the county where the Texas
a Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U.S. 43 (1907).
's121 Tex. 1, 37 S.W.2d 726 (1931).
3 id. at 5, 37 S.W.2d at 727-28.
40 Owen v. Younger, 242 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
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land was located. The contestant, the intestate heir of the decedent,
filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court contending (1) that
the Texas court had no jurisdiction since "original" jurisdiction lay
with Oklahoma; (2) that under Texas law, the subsequent marriage
of a woman revokes any will which she may have previously ex-
ecuted; and (3) that if this were not the correct Texas law, Texas
should apply the Oklahoma law by reason of the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution. The court rejected
all of these contentions and found that Texas was in no way bound
by the law of Oklahoma, that under Texas law, a will of an un-
married woman was not revoked by her later marriage, and, there-
fore, that the decedent died testate as to the Texas lands.
A similar result was reached in another case involving an Okla-
homa decedent and Texas lands. The proponent argued that "since
the will was originally probated by a court of general jurisdiction in
Oklahoma the judgment of that court is res judicata and protected
by the full faith and credit provisions of the national Constitu-
tion .... "" However, the court of civil appeals replied: "This cannot
be, because courts of other states have no jurisdiction over real
property in Texas and the vesting of title thereto is governed by the
laws of this State.
' '4 2
In short, Texas is in no way bound by a prior probate decree of
a sister state, insofar as property within Texas is concerned. A
fortiori, Texas is not bound by a prior probate decree rendered in
Mexico. Nor is Mexico bound by a prior Texas decree.
Would the result be different when the parties had appeared in
F-i? By the doctrine of res judicata, if the parties were present in
F-I, there is no reason why the same issues should be relitigated in
F-2. Of course, for such persons to have been present, they must
have been subject to the in personam jurisdiction of F-1.
Three cases from the Supreme Court of the United States illustrate
the problem of present concern. In the first,3 a Tennessee decedent
died intestate owning shares in a Kentucky corporation and a claim
against the corporation for profits. Under Tennessee law, the widow
would take all; under Kentucky law, she would receive one-half and
the other one-half would go to the decedent's mother.
The widow opened, ex parte, an administration in Tennessee (F-1)
stating that the decedent was a Tennessee domiciliary. She then sued
in the Tennessee chancery court, citing the mother and corporation
"'Ragland v. Wagener, 179 S.W.2d 380, 381-82 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd on other
grounds, 142 Tex. 651, 180 S.W.2d 435 (1944).4 2 Id. at 382.
43Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917).
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by publication, and obtained an adjudication that she was the owner
of the shares and was entitled to have new certificates issued to her.
Meanwhile, the mother obtained an administration in Kentucky, and
a decree stating that the property should be divided between the
widow and mother in accordance with Kentucky law. The widow
then sued in Kentucky (F-2) on her Tennessee decrees, and the
mother intervened, claiming her one-half based on her prior Ken-
tucky judgment. Kentucky (F-2) denied the widow's claim, and
she appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, contending
that F-2 was bound to give full faith and credit to the judgment
of F-1. The Court ruled for the mother, holding that if the F-1
judgments were considered to be in rem, they were conclusive only
as to property in Tennessee; but that if in personam, they were
binding only on parties before the Tennessee court.
In the second case, the will of a testatrix was originally probated
in Georgia as a domiciliary probate and all persons entitled to be
heard, including the decedent's husband, were personally served in
Georgia. The Georgia court appointed the person named in the will
as the decedent's executor after finding that the decedent was domi-
ciled in Georgia. Meanwhile, a New York court appointed the New
York Trust Company as administrator c.t.a. upon the suggestion of
the husband and the New York authorities. Among the assets of
the decedent's estate were some shares of the Coca Cola International
Corporation, a Delaware corporation. Coca Cola impleaded both
the Georgia executor and the New York administrator before a
Delaware court in order to determine to whom new certificates should
be issued. Delaware ruled for the New York administrator, and the
Georgia executor sought certiorari in the Supreme Court of the
United States on the theory that Delaware was bound to give full
faith and credit to the Georgia probate decree. The Court said:
While the Georgia judgment is to have the same faith and credit in
Delaware as it does in Georgia, that requirement does not give the
Georgia judgment extra-territorial effect upon assets in other states.
So far as the assets in Georgia are concerned, the Georgia judgment of
probate is in rem; so far as it affects personalty beyond the state, it is
in personam and can bind only the parties thereto or their privies."
Hence, the Georgia decision was conclusive as to the husband's rights,
since he was before the Georgia court in personam. With respect
to the right to tax the assets of the decedent, the New York ad-
ministrator and the State of New York, not having been parties to
" Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 353 (1942).
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the Georgia proceeding, were bound by the Georgia determination
only as to property having a situs in Georgia.
The difficulty of enforcing foreign probate decrees was again con-
sidered by the Supreme Court in 1958.*" The testatrix was originally
domiciled in Pennsylvania. She executed a revocable inter vivos trust
naming a Delaware trust company trustee, reserving the income to
herself for life and the corpus to whomever she might subsequently
appoint by deed or will. Then she moved to Florida, where she re-
mained domiciled until her death. In Florida, she executed a second
inter vivos instrument appointing 400,000 dollars of the trust prop-
erty to certain beneficiaries. She also executed a will with a residuary
clause appointing any remaining portion of the property which she
might own at death to another set of beneficiaries.
Her will was probated in Florida, the Delaware trust company
being served by mail and publication. The Florida court ruled that
the trust and power of appointment were ineffective, that the
400,000 dollars passed by the residuary clause, and that the court
had jurisdiction over the Delaware trust company.
Meanwhile, the trust company obtained a Delaware determina-
tion that the inter vivos appointment of the 400,000 dollars was
valid. Upon certiorari to the Supreme Court from both state courts,
it was held:
(1) Florida had neither in rem nor in personam jurisdiction over
the Delaware trust company. Without such jurisdiction, it could
not pass on the validity of the trust. Under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, its decree was void as to the trust
company and all others over whom it had no jurisdiction.
(2) Although Florida had jurisdiction over the probate and con-
struction of the decedent's will by reason of the decedent's domicile,
it had no in rem jurisdiction over the trust assets, and its judgment
was therefore invalid insofar as it rested on in rem jurisdiction.
(3) The exercise of the power of appointment in Florida did not
justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident
trustee.
(4) The fact that the decedent and most of the appointees and
beneficiaries were domiciled in Florida did not give Florida jurisdic-
tion over the trustee or the trust assets.
(5) Delaware was, therefore, under no obligation to give any
faith and credit to the Florida judgment.
(6) The trust company was an indispensable party under Florida
law. Accordingly, Florida had no power to adjudicate the contro-
4"Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (Warren, C.J.).
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versy without the trustee's presence. Hence, Delaware was not re-
quired to give the Florida judgment any faith and credit even against
parties over whom Florida had in personam jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice Black dissented in an opinion in which he was joined
by Justices Burton and Brennan. He argued that since Florida had
extensive contacts with the decedent and the beneficiaries, it could
adjudicate the effectiveness of the exercise of the power of appoint-
ment with respect to all those who were notified of the proceedings
and given an opportunity to be heard. Alternatively, he argued that
the case should have been remanded to have Florida, rather than the
Supreme Court, determine whether the trustee was an indispensable
party.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that Florida could find
that there was sufficient privity between the estate of the decedent,
i.e., the testatrix and her executors, and the nonresident trustee, and
that the estate might therefore stand in judgment for the trustee
insofar as the disposition of the property under the exercise of the
power of appointment and the will was concerned.
These rulings will have a great effect on Texas conflicts rules re-
garding the enforcement of foreign probate decrees. In all proba-
bility, Texas will not now give effect to a foreign probate decree,
except insofar as a court has in rem jurisdiction over assets or in
personam jurisdiction over parties who are personally served or who
appear in the prior litigation.
Will Mexico follow this trend of the Anglo-American law? Or
will it follow the procedures of the civil law countries? Italy has
indicated, for example, that foreign probate decrees will be recog-
nized." France has stated that the official character of probate pro-
ceedings will be recognized, but uncontested foreign probate decrees
may be examined. Germany permits the universal successor, e.g., the
Texas heir or residuary testamentary beneficiary, or his representa-
tive, to obtain a certificate limited to assets situated in Germany and
based on the foreign inheritance law. 7
Perhaps, if there is no contest, the Mexican courts will give recog-
nition to a prior Texas probate decree. However, if the problem
involves adjudicating rights of Mexican nationals with respect to
property having a situs in Mexico, we may well expect that Mexico
will want to examine the prior probate proceedings.
Although Texas is not bound to give effect to a foreign probate
decree affecting property in Texas, even in the absence of in per-
4 Rabel, op. cit. supra note 29, at 421.
'"BiIrgerliches Gesetzbuch §§ 2368, 2369.
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sonam jurisdiction in the prior proceeding, Texas statutes regarding
these foreign decrees give more recognition than one might expect.
Section 95 of the Texas Probate Code provides:
When application is made for the probate of a will . . . which has
been probated according to the laws of . . . any country . . . , a copy
of such will . . . and of the probate thereof, attested by the clerk of
the court or by such other official as has custody of such will . . . and
is in charge of such probate records, with the seal of the court affixed,
if there be a seal, together with a certificate from the judge or pre-
siding magistrate of such court that the said attestation is in due form,
may be filed and recorded in the minutes of the court in this state
having venue; and, when so filed and recorded, shall be deemed to be
admitted to probate, and shall have the same force and effect for all
purposes as if the original will had been probated in said court by
order of the court, provided its validity may be contested in the manner
and to the extent hereinafter provided.
This statute makes the probate of a foreign will automatic, so long
as there is no contest. Section 96 provides a procedure for filing and
recording a foreign will as a muniment of title in the deed records
of the county where the land is located. It may be desirable to file
under both sections. By so doing, one may establish a prima facie
case for the validity of the prior probate"s as well as a record4" and
notice"0 of the existence of the will and of any titles that it may
confer.
If a foreign will which is filed and recorded in Texas is subse-
quently contested in the foreign jurisdiction, the Texas probate will
be set aside if notice of that contest is filed in Texas within two
years following the filing of the foreign probate decree in Texas. 1
The filing of such notice automatically suspends the effect of the
will in Texas until verified proof is filed that the proceedings in the
foreign jurisdiction have been terminated in favor of the will. 2 If
the will is rejected in the foreign jurisdiction, such rejection will
cause the will to be rejected in Texas, unless the rejection is for a
reason which is not grounds for rejection in Texas."
48 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. S 97 (1956); Holland v. Jackson, 121 Tex. 1, 37 S.W.2d 726
(1931) (ex parte recital that testator's domicile was in California held prima facie proof
of facts recited).
"'Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 98 (1956); Smith v. Allbright, 261 S.W. 461 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1924) (deed from trustee, appointed by foreign court nineteen years after probate, as
shown by certified copy of proceedings filed under statute, held sufficient, since presumption
was that appointment was legally made and that trustee was proper grantor).
5 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 99 (1956).
.'Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 100 (1956).
5 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 101 (1956).
53 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 102 (1956).
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Some question may be raised as to the effect of the two-year pro-
vision. For example, assume that the executor in F-I obtains an ex
parte probate decree in which he is awarded letters testamentary. He
then files a recorded copy of the will and decree in Texas thereby
establishing prima facie that the foreign decree is valid. More than
two years from this date, a contest is begun in the foreign jurisdic-
tion. Although such contest might be permitted in a foreign juris-
diction which has a longer statute of limitations, it is barred in
Texas, 4 since one who desires to contest a domestic probate decree
must do so within two years after a will is admitted to probate.55
IX. THE POWERS OF FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES
Finally, the question arises as to what a foreign executor or ad-
ministrator can do once he has received his letters of administration
or letters testamentary from F-i. The term "executor" is used here
to refer to all types of such personal representatives."
The law governing Texas executors parallels some of that of
Mexico, because of the common Spanish origin. At common law,
the executor took title to personalty; whereas realty descended di-
rectly to the heir. However Texas, following the Spanish concept of
succession, provides that both realty and personalty shall descend
directly to the heir subject to a right of possession in the executor
for purposes of administration."
The Spanish law concerning universal executors also furnished
the model for the rather unusual (by common law standards) Texas
independent executor." Again, the Spanish law provided a number
of methods whereby an estate might be settled extrajudicially." These
likewise had a profound impact on Texas probate procedure.
Several Texas cases have indicated the importance of these statutes.
In one,0 the testator died on April 2, 1952, in Louisiana, the state
of domicile. On May 6, 1952, his widow offered a will, dated
September 12, 1951, for probate in Caddo Parish, Louisiana. This
will was later filed for record as a muniment of title in Gregg County,
Texas, where some of the decedent's land was located. In 1954, the
widow brought a proceeding in Gregg County to have the will of
"
4 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §5 100, 101 (1956).5 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. S 93 (1956).
s6 The civil code of Mexico uses the word "albacea," which means both executor and
administrator. In the text, reference is made to "albacea" as "executor."
" Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 37 (1956).
" McKnight, The Spanish Influence on the Texas Law of Civil Procedure, 38 Texas
L. Rev. 24, 48-49 (1959).
" Id. at 47.
6
"Jones v. Jones, 301 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref. n.r.e.
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September 12, 1951, declared null and void, on the theory that the
decedent had executed a later will in December, 1951. The county
court rejected her plea, and she appealed de novo to the district court.
There, a jury found that the decedent had executed a will on Decem-
ber 12, 1951, and that he had intended to revoke the will dated
September 12, 1951. The latter was not offered for probate.
The appellate court reversed, holding first, that the widow was
estopped by reason of having secured the entry of such prior pro-
bate decree when she was aware of all facts affecting such decree.
Secondly, since the will had been admitted to probate in the state
of domicile, and filed for record where the property was located,
Texas had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit to have the will declared
null and void.
In another case, 1 on similar facts, a court of civil appeals held
that the contestants were not bound by the foreign decree. The
testatrix was a widow who owned land in both Texas and Oklahoma.
She executed a will in 1954, naming one Barney, an Oklahoma domi-
ciliary, her executor. On her death, Barney probated her will in
Oklahoma and filed certified copies of the will and probate pro-
ceedings in the deed records of Llano and Comanche counties, Texas.
Meanwhile, the decedent's brother, Huff, sought an appointment as
temporary administrator in the county court of Llano County, con-
tending that the decedent was domiciled there and that the will
admitted to probate in Oklahoma and filed in Texas should be
canceled as null and void.
In the district court, a jury found that the decedent was domiciled
in Llano County at her death, and the trial court ruled the will void
as to Texas land. Although Huff had begun contest proceedings in
Oklahoma, which were not prosecuted to judgment, and had filed
a creditor's claim there for expenses incurred by him in the amount
of 97.91 dollars, which was ordered paid, he was not estopped to
seek to void the Oklahoma probate. It was held that "the only issue
before the trial court was the domicile of Mrs. Denny at the time
of her death and this issue when determined fixed the jurisdiction
for the probate of her will in Texas which jurisdiction is not proved
or conferred by estoppel." 2 Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed
the trial court's decision that the Oklahoma proceedings had no
effect as to the Texas land.
If the foreign executor succeeds in obtaining admission of the
1Barney v. Huff, 326 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e.
62 1d. at 623.
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foreign will in Texas, he will be issued letters testamentary."3 If
letters of administration have been previously issued to another, the
executor is entitled to have such letters revoked by giving bond,
even though the will provided that such bond was not necessary."
Until last year, if a foreign corporation were named executor, it
had to qualify to do business in Texas to serve in such capacity. As
such qualification was difficult and expensive, rarely would an out-
of-state bank or trust company seek to serve as an executor in
Texas. This has been corrected, as to banks and trust companies in
the United States, by the addition of section 105 (a) to the Texas
Probate Code. This section makes it possible for a foreign bank or
trust company to serve in a fiduciary capacity in Texas if the juris-
diction where such bank or trust company is organized grants similar
authority to Texas corporations.
Mexican corporations, of course, would still have to qualify under
the old law. In such a situation, it would probably be easier for the
Mexican bank to have a Texas resident seek an appointment as an-
cillary administrator c. t. a.
If it is expected that a Mexican will will be probated in Texas
because of property located there, such a will should contain a clause
giving the executor power to sell the property. This will eliminate
the necessity of obtaining a court order for such a sale. 5
Despite the somewhat liberal attitude displayed by the Texas
statutes insofar as foreign executors are concerned, Texas case law
follows the more traditional Anglo-American concept of plurality
of succession where administrators are involved. The office of ad-
ministrator of the estate of the decedent in one state is legally sep-
arate from such office in another state, even though the same indi-
vidual serves in both states.6" The ancillary administration will usually
be much more complicated than the simple authentication of a
foreign will and the filing of such will as a muniment of title. As
in the case of the foreign executor, the foreign administrator is re-
quired to appoint a resident agent to accept service of process."
X. CONCLUSION
The law of Texas with respect to foreign wills and foreign per-
sonal representatives has vacillated between the civil law concept of
"
3 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 105 (1956).
4Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 106 (1956).
" Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 107 (1956).
0 Carrigan v. Semple, 72 Tex. 306, 12 S.W. 178 (1888); Cherry v. Speight, 28 Tex.
503 (1866); Jones v. Jones, 15 Tex. 463 (1855); Clarke v. Webster, 94 S.W. 1088 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1906), aff'd, 100 Tex. 333, 99 S.W. 1019 (1907).
6 7 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 78(d) (1956).
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unity and the Anglo-American concept of plurality of succession.
Texas is fortunate in having a number of statutes that simplify the
work of the foreign personal representative, although much re-
mains to be done. Many of the difficulties may be resolved, however,
by the lawyer's careful drafting of the client's will, with an aware-
ness of the countless problems that arise when persons have contact
with several jurisdictions.
